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Income inequality in Korea has increased after the economic crisis, and the 
main reason for the widening of income distribution is due to the increase of the 
unemployed when analyzed using the Urban Household Report(UHR). 
However, income inequality has not decreased although the rate of 
unemployment decreased after 2000. Further data bases for income-related 
statistics are necessary to examine the exact causes of changing income 
inequality as a whole since the UHR covers only statistics on urban employees' 
wage and salary in Korea.
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I. Introduction 
 
 
It has been generally reported that the income distribution structure 
in Korea has worsened after the recent financial crisis of 1997.  Accord-
ing to the official statistics published by the Korea National Statistical 
Office (KNSO), the Gini Coefficient (incomes of urban workers), which 
measures the inequality of income distribution within a country, was 
measured at approximately 0.28 for the three years before the crisis and 
0.32 for the three years following the crisis.  However, the cause of wid-
ening income inequality was presumed to be the side effect from “the 
rich get richer and the poor get poorer” phenomenon resulting from 
various restructuring measures implemented during the crisis.  The 
underlying cause and the course of income inequality has not been pre-
cisely understood, thus far. 
In addition, the samples of urban household report, which are the 
basis for the official statistics published by KNSO, were completely dis-
continued1 during the financial crisis (between 1997 and 1998) thus, we 
cannot ignore the possibility that the rise in Gini Coefficient during 
these periods, immediately before and after the crisis, may be due to 
partially changing the samples. 
This paper was written to identify the underlying cause of 
worsening income distribution trends before and after the financial 
crisis.  Due to unavailability of data, this paper limits its analysis to the 
incomes of urban worker households published by KNSO’s Urban 
Household Reports.  To indirectly calculate the income statistics during 
the period when the data was completely discontinued the KDI Income 
Panel (Urban Workers) was used to analyze the income mobility for 
three years before and after the crisis.  Thus, the widening of income 
inequality was measured indirectly. 
In fact, due to the discontinuation of data before 1997 and after 1998, 
a direct comparison between these two periods was impossible.  Hence 
in our paper the period between 1995 and 1997, right before the crisis, 
which did not show substantial changes in income inequality or income 
distribution structure and 1998 to present, which showed definite in-
creases in income inequality, was compared and the cause of income 
inequality was analyzed. 
The following is the outline of this paper.  In Chapter II, the meth-
odology used to compile the “KDI Income Distribution Panel(Urban  
 
                                                          
1 In 1998, the Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO) changed the samples of the Economi-
cally Active Population and the Urban Household Reports by 100%. 
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Workers)” and its characteristics are explained.  In Chapter III, the 
changing trends of income distribution is analyzed and in Chapter IV, 
various analyses on income mobility for 3 years before and after the 
crisis of 1997 using the materials from the income panel are presented.  
In Chapter V, using the discussions from Chapter III and IV, the causes 
that increase income inequality before and after the crisis are analyzed.  
Finally, in Chapter VI, some future tasks are identified in order to im-
prove the income distribution. 
 
 
Ⅱ. Compositions of the KDI Income Panel 
(Urban Workers) 
 
 
1. The subject of the panel analysis  
 
The types of households analyzed on KNSO’s Urban Household re-
port,2 depending on the status of household head’s economic participa-
tion, were largely divided into two categories such as income-earning 
households and other households (includes no-occupation households).  
Although it is compiled annually, the statistics for other households are 
unreliable therefore this paper only considered income-earning house-
holds as the subject of analysis.  As shown in <Table 1> below, no-
occupation households, which include self-employed and unemployed 
households, are excluded from the components of the panel.  For that 
reason, only 60% of the sample of urban households is used for formu-
lating the panel. 
As shown in <Table 1>, the ratio of urban households starting 1995 
displayed a steady falling trend, in particular, at the start of the crisis 
(1998) the ratio of no-occupation households (including unemployed) 
rapidly increased compared to 1997.  Although the reports are discon-
tinued around the crisis period, when considering the relative recovery 
in the ratio of income earning households in 2000, it can be speculated 
that it has a close relationship with the increase rate of unemployment.  
Namely, considering the unemployment rate of 2.6% in 1997, 6.8% in 
1998, 6.3% in 1999, and 4.1% in 2000, the increased number of no-
occupation households closely resembles the rate of unemployment 
except  for 1999. 
Given this circumstance, a serious consideration should be taken 
                                                          
2 KNSO only publishes incomes of urban-dwelling, income-earning households with 2 or more 
persons.  Hence, incomes of unemployed, single person, and non-urban dwelling households are 
excluded.  On that ground, only 63.8% of all households are included in the sample.  The statistics 
used are limited since incomes of only 60% of the households are officially published, therefore it is 
safe to assume that only 38.3% of all households are being represented in this income report. 
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<Table 1> Type of Households included in the Annual Urban 
Household Report  
(Unit: %) 
Years 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Income-earning Households 63.5 63.0 62.1 58.5 56.6 57.3 
Self-employed 29.3 29.4 29.6 29.4 29.8 30.1 Other 
Households No-occupation 7.2 7.6 8.4 12.2 13.6 12.7 
Note: Self-employed category includes merchant, self-employed, law-practice, freelance; 
no-occupation denotes households without a stable income but relies on pension, allow-
ance from other members of the family, income from interest, etc.  
Source: The initial data of urban households excluding imputation households were used 
in the calculation. 
 
when dealing with no-occupation households, which include unem-
ployed households when trying to grasp the distribution structure 
changes.  However, this task is not so simple since the incomes of no-
occupation households are not published in KNSO’s data.  For example, 
when distribution structure is analyzed with no-occupation or unem-
ployed households included the respondent households are presumed 
to have other incomes such as employment benefits—transfer income, 
miscellaneous incomes, etc. other than earned income but in the analy-
sis all incomes start at zero therefore the possibility of overestimating 
the worsening effect of distribution structure may occur.  On the other 
hand, if no-occupation and unemployed households are omitted from 
the analysis, the income-earning households convert to no-occupation 
or unemployed households eliminating the downward income aspect 
from the analysis thus leading to the possibility of underestimating the 
worsening effect of distribution structure. 
The no-occupation household in the panel composition were omit-
ted from the analysis under a strong assumption that the ratio of 
households that are included in the sample every year and those ex-
cluded are similar, depending on the change of household type.  More-
over, households that were income earning before the crisis but con-
verted to unemployed households after the crisis were omitted from the 
analysis since their incomes are considered as zero leading to either 
overestimated or underestimated income distribution.  Consequently, 
there is a possibility that the extent of income inequality3 of households 
used in the panel data of this study may be underestimated.  
In order to solve the underestimation problem, reviewing the char-
acteristics of households that are left out from the sample of KNSO’s 
initial data and appropriately adjusting the weight of these  
                                                          
3 The same problem arises when calculating the rate of income inequality using KNSO’s initial 
data of urban household report.  For this reason when calculating the rate of income inequality the 
KNSO also excludes no-occupation households (including unemployed households). 
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households may be one of the methods in compiling the panel.  How-
ever, due to the difficulty in setting a standard value in the above-
mentioned adjustment method, since incomes of no-occupation or un-
employed households are not published, this paper leaves this problem 
as a future research task in the field of income distribution.  
In income tax burden distribution study of Sung (2000), unemployed 
households were included in the income-earning households in the 
analysis.  His study, in order to reflect that the unemployed household 
ratio was overly exaggerated compared to the real unemployment rate 
randomly eliminated portions of unemployed household and then ad-
justed their ratio when reorganizing his sample.  Still, even with the 
adjustment it is difficult to wholly understand the changes of distribu-
tion structure. 
 
 
2. Handling imputation and households that are  
excluded 
 
The survey rate of KNSO’s income (household) report are around 
82% level for the period between 1995~2000 and in place of those 
households omitted from the survey, the income and expenditure data 
of households selectively chosen under KNSO’s standard were used.  
These same households were not surveyed every year on a regular ba-
sis and their substitution each year is difficult to trace hence, in the KDI 
Income Panel, households denoted as ‘Imputation’ were deleted4 from 
the initial data provided by KNSO. 
The imputation households are those households not included in the 
report because they did not respond to the survey.  If substituted 
households on the report show remarkable difference in characteristics 
from the omitted imputation households then this will create sample 
selection bias ultimately causing error on the analysis.  Moreover, with-
out any information on characteristic differences between the imputa-
tion households and all households, the problems arising from sample 
selection cannot be solved. 
 
<Table 2> The Annual Ratio of Imputation Households 
(Unit: %) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Ratio 19.2 17.7 18.4 22.5 19.5 18.9 
 
                                                          
4 The quarterly and yearly statistics published in KNSO’s Annual Report include all imputation 
data. 
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Therefore, households that were included in the reference year but 
excluded in the following year or the one after were excluded when 
compiling the KDI Income Panel (Urban Workers).   
The most probable method in solving this discrepancy, is to com-
pare the characteristic difference between the households excluded 
from the sample (starting after the reference year) and the households 
that were kept and then inserting households that are most similar in 
characteristics to the households in the sample.5  The method above and 
previously mentioned problems relating to unreleased income status of 
unemployed households are dealt in the section that discusses future 
research tasks. 
The households that fall under the two above-mentioned groups are 
excluded from the KDI Income Panel (Urban Workers).  The 
households included in the KDI Income panel are those that maintained 
the status of income-earning household for three consecutive years and 
were surveyed at least once a year.  The ratio of these households is ap-
proximately less than 50% compared to the reference year.  Due to 
households that did not respond to the survey, or cannot locate, etc., 
and households that convert to other household status (including no-
occupation) from employed household are excluded from the sample, 
the second year showed 30% drop rate in the households that are in-
cluded and 20% in the third year. 
 
<Table 3> Number of Sample Households and their Annual Repre-
sentation Rate (When Matching) 
Period 
Year         First Year Second Year Third Year 
1995 4,032  
1996 3,935 
2,818 
(69.9%) 
1997 3,576  
2,759 
(70.1%) 
1,947 
(48.3%) 
1998 3,731  
1999 3,590 
2,560 
(68.6%) 
2000 3,467 
2,539 
(70.7%)  
1,776 
(48.1%) 
 
                                                          
5 Refer to Kang (2000) for detailed explanation. 
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3. Compiling method of KDI Income Panel 
(Urban Workers) 
 
When annual data are used as a part of the panel, the household ID 
provided by KNSO was used for the matching key.  For the ten deciles, 
the households were aligned according to their average monthly in-
come then the aggregate of monthly average ratio was divided by ten.  
Also, in determining the average monthly income level, the quar-
terly Consumer Price Index (1995=100) was used in order to eliminate 
the effects of income changes due to inflation.  
In a strict sense, KNSO’s initial data of urban households is not 
based on a household standard.  This is because although the data con-
sists of monthly information on similar households however, their an-
nual data ignores the status of the households whether they are same 
households or not, and simply adds the monthly data to produce over-
all statistics. 
Taking this into consideration, in the annual initial data when same 
households are observe in different month in the annual initial data, 
they were considered as one household and their mean value was used 
in compiling the panel.  Accordingly, when preparing the annual index 
on income distribution using this data, each household is considered as 
a separate entity although similar households overlap yearly.  Hence, to 
a certain extent there will be some differences from the “Annual Urban 
Household Report” published by KNSO, which measures the Gini Co-
efficient of Korea. 
 
 
4. Data comparison of Initial statistics 
 
First, when comparing the initial data of urban households to the to-
tal data on household standard, the yearly mean value of various 
monthly income of the total data on household standard showed lower 
average income as well as lower total income ratio in 1997 and 2000 for 
households selected from the initial data of urban households.  In gen-
eral, relatively high income-earning households are regularly included 
in the monthly sample whereas relatively low income-earning house-
holds are either omitted from the survey or have the high tendency to 
convert to self-employed or unemployed households and thus having 
high frequency in being left out from the survey.  Therefore, it is pre-
sumed that in the initial data the high income-earning households are 
repeatedly calculated as independent households displaying higher 
average income level than the total data on household standard.  More-
over, the backings of higher results shown in 1997 and 2000 cannot be 
explained. 
The KDI Income Panel was compiled using the household standard  
 <Table 4> Various Data Comparison of Initial Statistics 
(Unit: thousand won, %) 
Urban Household 
Initial Data 
Household Standard 
Data 
KDI Income Panel 
 
1997 2000 1997 2000 1997 2000  
Ave. Ratio Ave. Ratio Ave. Ratio Ave. Ratio Ave. Ratio Ave. Ratio
Total Income 3,713.2 100.0         3,705.4 100.0 3,725.3 100.0 3,592.8 100.0 4,056.0 100.0 3,982.9 100.0
Income         2,087.0 56.2 1,964.5 53.0 1,993.9 53.5 1,831.2 51.0 2,129.1 52.5 2,015.7 50.6
Current Income          1,953.1 52.6 1,822.4 49.2 1,865.7 50.1 1,703.5 47.4 1,997.0 49.2 1,853.6 46.5
Earned Income 1,769.0 47.6         1,653.1 44.6 1,686.7 45.3 1,529.4 42.6 1,802.4 44.4 1,673.3 42.0
 Household Heads 1,407.8 37.9 1,349.3 36.4      1,352.4 36.3 1,254.1 34.9 1,436.8 35.4 1,363.7 34.2
Spouse           194.9 5.2 166.1 4.5 189.0 5.1 149.3 4.2 191.2 4.7 158.8 4.0
Others           166.2 4.5 137.6 3.7 145.3 3.9 126.0 3.5 174.4 4.3 150.8 3.8
Self-employed and  
Subsidiary Jobs 72.0          1.9 77.6 2.1 69.4 1.9 75.2 2.1 75.5 1.9 79.9 2.0
Property Income 48.9 1.3 37.1 1.0       43.5 1.2 33.5 0.9 56.4 1.4 42.2 1.1
Transfer Income 63.1 1.7 54.7 1.5       66.1 1.8 65.4 1.8 62.8 1.5 58.2 1.5
Non-current Income 133.9 3.6 142.2        3.8 128.1 3.4 127.8 3.6 132.1 3.3 162.2 4.1
Other Income          1,333.4 35.9 1,535.9 41.4 1,440.0 38.7 1,558.2 43.4 1,619.0 39.9 1,759.5 44.2
Transfer from Last Month 292.9 7.9         205.0 5.5 291.4 7.8 203.3 5.7 307.9 7.6 207.6 5.2
Number of Employed 1.6      1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5
Ave. Age of Household  
Head 40.3      40.9 39.0 40.1 41.7 42.2
Note: Total income = Income + Other incomes + Transfer from previous month 
 <Table 5> The Ratio of Surveyed Households and their Average Income 
(Unit: thousand won, %) 
1995⇒1996 1996⇒1997 1998⇒1999 1999⇒2000 
 
Ratio1) Ave. Income2) Ratio 
Ave. 
Income Ratio 
Ave. 
Income Ratio 
Ave. 
Income 
KDI Income Panel 
(Urban Workers) Households 69.4        1,895.9 69.8 2,009.1 68.8 1,716.6 70.5 1,752.1
Non-respondent       25.4 1,687.1 25.4 1,856.6 22.2 1,589.1 22.3 1,666.7
Household Type Change3) 5.2        1,737.1 4.8 1,846.8 9.1 1,640.8 7.2 1,666.3
Note: 1) The weight was considered hence, there is a slight difference between the panel maintenance rate of two periods in <Table 3>. 
2) Income = Current Income + Non-current Income 
3) Other households include households that converted their status to (self-employed and unemployed households) 
 
 
<Table 6> Trends of Gini Coefficient  
 
Household Standard 
 Initial Data of Urban Households Household Standard KDI Income Panel 
1995    0.284 0.255 0.247
1996    0.291 0.260 0.246
1997    0.283 0.254 0.249
1998    0.316 0.284 0.273
1999    0.320 0.287 0.267
2000    0.317 0.293 0.289 
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from the period three years immediately before and after the crisis only 
using the households that were included in every year with known in-
come.  Accordingly, for those households that changed their status, for 
instance, from earned-income household to self-employed, unem-
ployed households or households due to address changes that were not 
included in the survey were eliminated from the panel.  In general, 
since these households are assume to have low-income level it is judged 
that the average income level in the KDI panel is slightly higher than 
the average income shown in other data as seen in Table 5. 
 
 
III. Trends of Income Distribution Before and 
After the Financial Crisis 
 
 
1. Trends of income inequality 
 
As shown in <Table 6>, the Gini Coefficient for urban worker 
households before the crisis was 0.28 and after the crisis 0.32, slightly 
higher after the crisis (same as data published by KNSO).  
However, the Gini Coefficient of the total data on household stan-
dard, which was composed by reorganizing the same households on 
the initial data of urban households, was 0.26 before the crisis and 0.29 
after the crisis. The Gini Coefficient of KDI Income Panel (Urban Work-
ers), which compiled panels for three years before and after the crisis 
displayed 0.25 for before the crisis and 0.27 after the crisis. 
It is believed that the fundamental reason for the difference in Gini 
Coefficient in each data is the methods used in compiling each statistic 
data, as explained in Chapter II of this study.  KNSO’s initial data and 
the total data of household standard had a difference of ±0.03 Gini 
point.  Theoretically, the difference in Gini point is difficult to explain.  
For instance, when monthly units of overlapping household data are 
integrated into yearly unit and its average is used, there is a possibility 
that the result can be higher or lower than the actual rate of income ine-
quality. 
Meanwhile, the difference observed in the Gini Coefficient of KDI 
Income Panel, which used data of closely followed households for three 
consecutive years, and the Gini Coefficient of KNSO’s initial data is 
mainly caused by omission of relatively low-income households giving 
rise to more households that increase the extent of income inequality in 
the panel, as explained in <Table 4>. 
There is one common point among these Gini Coefficients shown 
above.  It is clear that all three coefficients did not show any substantial 
changes from 1995 to 1997 (before the crisis) but, during 1998 to 2000 
(after the crisis) there was approximately 0.01 increase in Gini point in 
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2000, except for the initial data of urban households, indicating that the 
income inequality rate after the crisis did increase.  
 
 
2. Trends of Income Distribution 
 
In order to observe the changing trends of income distribution, some 
type of classification is needed.  There are many classifications used to 
describe income levels however, in this study, we will use income clas-
sification system relative to OCED (1995). 
In OECD (1995) and Yoo (1999), those earning 150% and above me-
dian will be classified as high-income class and those earning less than 
50% of median will be called low-income class.  From the existing mid-
dle-income class, those earning 70~ 150% of median will be considered 
as middle-income class and those earning 50~70% will be called mod-
est-income class. 
The analysis result from the above classification shows increasing 
trend for the ratio of low-income class after the crisis but then it became 
stagnant after 2000.  But, when this rate was compared with the rate 
before the crisis, the rate after 2000 has somewhat increased.  And, 
among the middle-income classes, the increasing ratio of modest-
income class was very unique. 
The ratio of middle-income class, which has been continually falling 
since before the crisis until 1999 however increased somewhat in 2000 
defying the ‘collapse of middle-income class’ phenomenon that was 
raised frequently after the crisis.  Hence, concluding that the middle-
income class collapsed due to the financial crisis is too hasty when data 
shows the actual reduction began before the crisis and when the in-
creasing trend is still observed three years after the crisis.  The trends of 
middle-income class should be observed for longer time span. 
Based on the 1997 income distribution, which used classification of 
the relative income levels of OECD standard, <Table 8>, analyzes the 
annual income distribution and changes with inflation rate in mind  
Using 1997 as the reference year, the analysis result for the ratio of 
high-income class increased until immediately after the crisis and again 
in 2000, increasing trend was seen.  The ratio of low-income class dis-
played symmetrical ratio to the high-income class.  Following the sym-
metrical ratio of high-income and low-income classes, the ratio of mid-
dle-income class showed stable ratio however, the ratio of modest-
income class showed increasing tendency after the crisis.  
When considering the income distribution changes of 1997, we can 
fairly reason that the increases in both low-income and modest-income 
classes are one of the factors that worsened the whole income distribution 
structure after the crisis.  However, more research must be done in or-
der for this static analysis result to support the existing argument,
 <Table 7> Trends of Income Class (Relative Changes) 
(Unit: %) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
High Income Class 22.1 22.8 21.8 22.9 23.3 22.0 
Middle Income 69.0 54.8 67.5 53.6 68.5        54.8 65.4 51.6 64.7 50.6 66.1 51.7Middle 
Class Modest Income 69.0 14.1 67.5 13.9 68.5        13.7 65.4 13.8 64.7 14.1 66.1 14.5
Low Income Class 8.9 9.7 9.7 11.7 11.9 11.9 
Source: KNSO, from the initial data of urban households 
 
 
<Table 8> Income Level Changes (based on 1997) 
(Unit: %) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
High Income Class 16.6 20.8 21.8 14.3 15.9 17.4 
Middle Income             71.7 53.8 68.7 53.4 68.5 54.8 68.1 49.2 67.2 49.0 67.9 51.5Middle 
Class Modest Income             71.7 17.9 68.7 15.3 68.5 13.7 68.1 18.9 67.2 18.3 67.9 16.4
Low Income Class 11.7 10.6 9.7 17.6 16.9 14.7 
Source: KNSO, from the initial data of urban households  
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which states that the income of low-income class compared to other 
income classes decreased substantially worsening the distribution struc-
ture after the crisis. 
 
 
IV. Income Mobility 
 
 
1. Methodology used in determining income mobility 
 
There are many ways to measure income mobility depending on 
what is being studied through income mobility.  However, in general, 
the following methodology is used to conduct most of the studies.  In 
Fields (2001) measuring method of income mobility study was divided 
into three categories.  First, income changes of a given unit are observed 
throughout various set times.  For example, when determining the in-
come mobility changes of different income classes in a fixed period of 
time a panel data of the subject group is needed.  Second, to solve the 
problems that arise due to the measuring unit, the subject group can be 
either an individual or a household.  Third, to determine the different 
aspects of economic welfare then the subjects can be income, consump-
tion, earned income, etc. 
This study aims to analyze and compare the extent of income mobil-
ity during the two periods before and after the financial crisis.  Period A 
designates time between 1995-1997 and Period B, between 1998 and 
2000.  Studies done in other countries usually analyze 5 year-period as 
one unit however, in this study the data are analyzed and compared 
around the time of the crisis between Period A and B due to the fact 
that this was a unique occurrence and also due to lack of data availabil-
ity.  In addition, this study’s underlying source, the sample from 
KNSO’s Urban Household Report had been reorganized completely 
around the crisis period thus it was impossible to compile the panel for 
1997 and 1998.  This is the main reason that this study observed only 
two given periods such as Period A and B.  Accordingly, due to limited 
data availability this study aims to indirectly determine the changes in 
distribution structure before and after the financial crisis.  The measur-
ing unit is per household, and the subject of analysis is limited to 
household income.  Measuring standard for consumption and earned 
income will be left to future studies in this field. 
 
1-a. Measuring the income decile movement 
(income positional movement) 
 
One of the methods used to determine the extent of income mobility 
Analysis on the Change and Its Cause of Income Distribution before and after the Financial Crisis 155 
 
before and after the crisis is to first measure each household income to 
decile income and observe the mobility changes of the same household 
after given lapse of time whether there was change in its decile.  With-
out observation, it is clear that the period after the crisis supported 
more mobility in decile of household income than the period before.  It 
is predicted if the crisis did influence the economic structure of Korea 
then the households subject to the survey with minute changes before 
the crisis would have shown greater mobility in income decile after the 
crisis. 
In order to measure the above statement, the immobility ratio (IR) 
index can be used.  This index represents households with the same 
decile income at the beginning and at the end of a given period.  If Pe-
riod A: 1995~1997 showed less mobility in income decile for each 
household than the Period B: 1998~2000, the IR ratio of Period A will be 
higher then Period B. 
Prepared by using the initial data of urban households and KDI In-
come Panel data, the IR ratio of <Table 9> and <Table 10>, using the 
transition matrix, is 0.314 during 1995~1997 and 0.297 during 1998~2000.  
For instance, 31.4% of total households showed no changes in their dec-
ile income for Period A and 29.7% for Period B.  It is estimated that dur-
ing Period B (after the crisis), the extent of decile income mobility was 
higher.6
During Period A, 36.6% of the total households displayed upward 
income decile movement while 31.9% displayed downward movement.  
During Period B, 43.2% showed upward movement and 27.1% showed 
downward movement, recording an increase of 6.6%p upward decile 
movement after the crisis.   
<Table 11> compares the source of income for households that are 
classified by their income mobility (i.e. downward, unchanged, up-
ward).  After separating the two periods, 1997 (before the crisis) and 
2000 (after the crisis), households with downward, unchanged, or up-
ward income mobility was compared for particular characteristics how-
ever, non were found.  
The Shorrock’s Index (SI) is another index that indicates the extent of 
decile income mobility, a very similar concept to IR Index.  The funda-
mental concept of SI and IR is that only diagonal matrix is used to de-
termine the decile income mobility when relating to transition matrix.  
SI is defined as [C –tr(M)/(C-1)].  Here, tr(M) denotes trace of M while 
C denotes decile.  Hence, if the extent of decile income mobility de-
creases at the two point of comparison then tr(M) will increase while SI 
will decrease. 
                                                          
6 First, KNSO’s initial data of urban households was used to determine the income decile from 
the reference year and the compared year and then the KDI Income Panel was used to calculate the 
extent of decile income mobility for households that were observed for three consecutive years. 
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<Table 9> Income Decile Mobility before the Financial Crisis 
(Unit: %) 
1997 
1995 Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ 
Ⅰ 53.1 18.2 9.2 10.6 2.9 3.2 2.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 
Ⅱ 19.8 32.9 16.0 14.4 6.5 4.1 3.7 0.8 0.0 1.9 
Ⅲ 9.3 21.9 27.5 15.8 12.7 6.2 4.4 0.6 1.7 0.0 
Ⅳ 8.9 8.0 9.2 19.3 21.4 12.6 10.8 6.9 1.3 1.5 
Ⅴ 2.0 8.3 14.3 13.0 12.9 20.6 13.3 12.3 1.9 1.5 
Ⅵ 0.2 1.7 5.1 9.0 12.4 18.5 22.8 13.3 12.1 4.9 
Ⅶ 2.4 2.5 2.7 5.7 5.9 22.7 20.9 18.7 12.4 6.3 
Ⅷ 0.4 1.6 2.6 4.1 6.4 11.0 18.4 25.9 19.0 10.7 
Ⅸ 0.2 1.3 0.9 2.4 4.8 7.9 6.8 17.2 35.1 23.3 
Ⅹ 0.4 0.0 0.7 3.3 5.0 0.4 2.7 8.8 14.3 64.6 
 
 
<Table 10> Income Decile Mobility after the Financial Crisis 
(Unit: %) 
2000 
1998 Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ 
Ⅰ 45.7 20.2 17.9 7.7 5.2 3.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ⅱ 18.9 23.6 20.6 13.0 12.1 8.0 2.3 1.1 0.5 0.0 
Ⅲ 14.6 12.4 22.5 20.5 6.8 10.2 5.0 6.0 1.1 1.0 
Ⅳ 3.7 7.0 15.2 21.1 24.6 12.2 11.0 2.4 2.5 0.4 
Ⅴ 3.0 4.5 6.8 13.3 18.4 16.5 22.5 7.8 5.4 2.1 
Ⅵ 0.4 3.8 5.2 6.0 14.7 21.9 20.4 18.2 5.8 3.7 
Ⅶ 1.3 0.3 2.5 8.4 8.3 11.3 21.1 22.9 16.1 8.0 
Ⅷ 1.5 0.0 0.3 3.1 3.5 9.7 12.4 27.7 29.9 12.0 
Ⅸ 0.8 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.8 4.6 4.2 16.3 32.8 34.2 
Ⅹ 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.0 3.7 3.7 6.1 20.3 61.8  
 <Table 11> Type of Income Mobility: Breakdown of Income Sources 
(Unit: thousand won, %) 
1997 (1995→1997) 2000 (1998→2000) 
Downward Unchanged Upward Downward Unchanged Upward  
Ave. Ratio Ave. Ratio Ave. Ratio Ave. Ratio Ave. Ratio Ave. Ratio
Total Income 3,191.9 100 4,661.0 100 4,289.2       100 3,304.6 100 4,398.0 100 4,122.5 100
Income          1,675.4 52.5 2,364.1 50.7 2,322.5 54.1 1,473.9 44.6 2,232.9 50.8 2,205.8 53.5
Current Income 1,574.6 49.3 2,243.0 48.1 2,153.6        50.2 1,411.9 42.7 2,085.6 47.4 1,970.7 47.8
Earned Income 1,439.2 45.1 2,025.8 43.5 1,927.0        44.9 1,258.5 38.1 1,895.9 43.1 1,780.1 43.2
Household heads 1,210.5 37.9 1,622.2          34.8 1,474.7 34.4 1,052.7 31.9 1,531.6 34.8 1,443.1 35.0
Spouse           102.2 3.2 242.5 5.2 224.7 5.2 90.6 2.7 228.0 5.2 153.9 3.7
Others           126.5 4.0 161.1 3.5 227.6 5.3 115.2 3.5 136.4 3.1 183.1 4.4
Self-employed &  
Subsidiary jobs  58.6            1.8 81.6 1.8 84.8 2.0 56.8 1.7 94.8 2.2 84.1 2.0
Property Income 33.2 1.0 80.6 1.7 55.7        1.3 42.5 1.3 43.8 1.0 40.9 1.0
Transfer Income 43.6 1.4 55.0 1.2 86.0        2.0 54.2 1.6 51.1 1.2 65.6 1.6
Non-current Income 100.8 3.2 121.1 2.6         168.9 3.9 62.0 1.9 147.3 3.3 235.1 5.7
Other Incomes 1,226.6 38.4 1,983.1 42.5 1,648.1        38.4 1,630.0 49.3 1,954.9 44.4 1,706.3 41.4
Transfer from Previ-
ous Month 289.8            9.1 313.8 6.7 318.6 7.4 200.6 6.1 210.2 4.8 210.3 5.1
Number of Employed       1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.6
Ave. Age of  
Household 41.3     43.3 40.7 42.6 43.3 41.3  
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In fact, after the actual calculation, SI(SIa) of Period A was 0.766 and 
SI(SIb) of Period B was 0.782 clearly displaying greater decile income 
mobility after the crisis than before, supporting the result of IR. 
Kim (2001) used similar data as this study to analyze decile income 
mobility (V decile) of a period between 1988~1992 and period between 
1993~1997.  Kim reported the SI results of each period as 0.627 and 
0.642, respectively.  Although the results from Kim (2001) and this 
study cannot be compared directly due to differences such as the dura-
tion of analysis (5 years (Kim’s) and 3 years (ours)) and the division of 
income deciles (5 deciles (Kim’s) and 10 deciles (ours)) however, when 
looking at the overall results, it is safe to assum that the income mobil-
ity in Korea during the mid 1990s decreased compared to the beginning 
of 1990s but, the extent of income mobility is on the rising trend since 
the crisis. 
Linking income equality to this result, the extent of income inequal-
ity in the 1990s continued its decreasing trend until mid 1990s and 
started to increase.  Hence, in Korea, it is possible to hypothesize that 
income mobility and income inequality have a proportional relation-
ship.  
In order to prove the above hypothesis with more precision, a con-
struction of statistical database with longer duration and detailed statis-
tics work must precede, however, recalling Kuzents’ (1955) Inverse U 
Hypothesis will help in understanding the above hypothesis.  For exam-
ple, the main point in his hypothesis states that income distribution 
worsens at the beginning of economic development however as eco-
nomic development matures income distribution will improve.  On the 
other hand, that same hypothesis can be interpreted as the extent of 
income mobility will increase at the beginning of economic develop-
ment but in a stable environment after the economic growth the extent 
of income mobility will decrease.  Of course, Kuzents’ hypothesis is not 
popularly accepted due to various counter findings.  However, unlike 
the past, a speedy technological progress in a new economic system 
(knowledge-based economy) is being established.  And, if we perceive 
this as the beginning of a new economic development, it can be ex-
plained from the hypothesis that current increase in income mobility is 
a part of the economic development process. 
 
1-b. Estimation and verification of decile income mobility 
 
The above presumed IR or SI simply helps us to understand the ex-
tent of income mobility of a household with no decile income mobility 
within a given period of time.  Hence, the direction and degree of 
households with decile income mobility was not reflected.  In other 
words, in view of decile income transition matrix, other than the diago-
nal matrix, the extent of household income was not reflected.   
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There is another measuring method that reflects the extent of house-
hold income mobility as well as decile income mobility other than the 
diagonal matrix.  The Pearson Chi-squared Calculation first measures 
the household income mobility and then calculates whether there was 
also a change in the extent of decile mobility during the two given peri-
ods.  The concept and estimation methods for the Pearson Chi-squared 
Calculation are as follows. 
First, if there is no decile income mobility at the two given periods, 
the composition of decile income transition matrix is 1 for diagonal ma-
trix and the rest is composed of identity matrix, which is zero.  If this 
was reversed, for instance, reverse identity matrix, then the income dis-
tribution at the two given periods would be completely opposite.  As 
such, it is safe to say that in both cases the income distribution at the 
compared period has perfect time dependence with the income distribu-
tion of the reference period.  
On the other hand, hypothetically, if transition matrix at the refer-
ence period has perfect time independence, the households on the panel 
will have completely different income distribution at the compared pe-
riod and the reference period.  
Given this perspective, we can consider the hypothetical transition 
matrix where each factor has equal value.  For example, if we use 10 
decile distribution and the number of the sample is designated as N, we 
can assume all factors of transition matrix to be 0.01N matrix.  Using 
this matrix, we can determine whether income distribution at the com-
pared period has perfect time dependence with income distribution of the 
reference period.  Depending on the degree of difference between the 
two periods of the transition matrix and the above hypothetical matrix 
will indirectly determine whether the income distribution at the com-
pared period and the reference period has a meaningful difference. X2 
provides the evaluating standard.  
Concisely, for hypothetical verification of the difference between the 
actual transition matrix and the hypothetical transition matrix the fol-
lowing null hypothesis was set and X2 was used to statistically verify 
the difference. 
 
H0: denotes income mobility at perfect time independence  
 
The value of X2 is as follows.  When each factor value of hypothetical 
matrix is denoted as EXPij and the observed value of actual transition 
matrix as OBSij ,  
 
−= Σ Σ
2( )ij ij
i j
ij
OBS EXP
EXP
2X2  
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The equation provides information on the degree of independence 
of the actual transition matrix from the reference period.  Also, through 
comparison of X2 value obtained from the two different transition ma-
trix, information on which matrix showed more independent income 
mobility from the reference period can be provided. 
For example, greater the value of X2, occurrence of a higher degree of 
perfect time dependence at the reference period and accordingly, a less 
degree of income mobility.  
In KDI Income Panel (Urban Workers), the X2 value of Period A was 
2,351.2, and Period B was calculated as 2,019.4, rejecting the hypothesis 
which states that the transition matrix of both periods are independent 
from the reference period7 and further showed the income mobility af-
ter the crisis was more prominent then immediately before the crisis. 
The Correlation Coefficient, is another index, which determines the re-
lationship between the change of income distribution at the compared 
period to the distribution structure of the reference period.  The correla-
tion coefficient between 1995 to 1997 was 0.777 while between 1998 and 
2000 was 0.592, reconfirming the above X2 value and showing that the 
income mobility during Period B was much active than Period A.   
 
1-c. Symmetric Income Movement 
 
Up to now, the main discussion was focused on the direction of in-
come mobility for the two periods.  However, there are many other fac-
tors that can be evaluated when studying the income mobility.  In this 
section, the quantitative views on income mobility before and after the 
crisis will be discussed.  For this perspective, Fields and Ok (1996,1999a) 
Index, which was developed for this specific reason will be used.  A 
brief outline of the index is as follows: First, the reference period income 
is denoted as xi, the compared period income yi, and the size of the 
sample as n.  Then the total income mobility can be defined as follows. 
 
(1)
nd (x, y) = ∑i=1 |xi- yi| (1) 
 
When the above equation is divided by n, the income mobility per 
person can be expressed as below.  
       
(1)
nm (x, y) = ∑i=1 |xi- yi|/n (2) 
 
When the above equation is divided by the aggregated income of 
reference year, it is possible to calculate the average income mobility as 
shown below.  
                                                          
7 In statistical significance, when calculated X2 value is C*C transition matrix, it is verified as 
freedom of C(C-1) 
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(1)
np  (x, y) = ∑i=1 |xi- yi|/ ∑i=1 xi (3) 
 
Fields (2001) named the above indices, F-O 1 set of measures.   
In KDI Income Panel (Urban Workers), when calculating the values 
of d⑴, m⑴, and p⑴ for Period A (before the crisis) and Period B (after the 
crisis), the values for Period A were 933,955,486 won, 479,690 won, and 
0.252, respectively and for Period B, 1,058,952,945 won, 589,617 won, 
and 0.336, respectively. 
As seen above, it is clear even in the absolute quantity sense, the in-
come mobility of Period B (after the crisis) is much greater compared to 
Period A (before the crisis).  Even in the average income mobility (p(1)) 
per person shown for Period A, which is around 25% and Period B, 
around 34% also verify that more changes occurred after the crisis 
rather than before in terms of individual income.   
In Fields (2001), F-O 2 measures are used as well as F-O 1 measures.    
Among these measures, m(2) index takes individual income difference 
into consideration and determines the extent of income mobility by us-
ing the average of income difference rate, which is shown below. 
 
(2)
nm  (x, y) = ∑i=1 |log xi- log yi|/n (4) 
 
The above measure emphasizes that the extent of individual’s in-
come mobility can differ depending on his/her income size.  For exam-
ple, a difference of additional ten million won to a person with an an-
nual salary of thirty million won to a person with an annual salary of 
sixty million won, would result in significant income ratio difference. 
The m(2) for Period A was 0.26 and for Period B was 0.3. 
In addition, d(1) can be separated into growth component and trans-
fer component using the method below.  
 
(1)
nd (x, y) = ∑i=1 |xi- yi| = (1)ng  (x, y) +  (x, y) (5) (1)nt
 
Here, (1)ng  (x, y) = ∑i=1 yi - ∑i=1 xi  and  (x, y) = 2 (∑(1)nt i∈Ln(x,y)=0  (xi- yi)).  
And, Ln(x, y) denotes total households that displayed income reduc-
tion during the analysis period.   
Using the given materials to determine the above value, among the 
total income mobility during Period A, 41% was due to the growth 
component and 59% was due to the transfer component.  For Period B, 
50.6% due to growth component and 49.4% due to transfer component.  
For instance, after the crisis, half of the income mobility was caused by 
the economic growth.  This phenomenon was believed to have been 
caused by the minus economic growth rate in 1998, which rebounded in 
1999 and 2000. 
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1-d. Assessment on income mobility direction 
 
In previous sections, mainly indices that determine the flow of in-
come mobility were used in order to observe the income mobility be-
fore and after the financial crisis.  
However, the assessment on the direction of income mobility be-
tween the two periods cannot be determined by indices used above.  
For indices that measure the directional income mobility before and 
after the crisis, the mobility direction for each period can be determined 
by comparisons such as ratio between income-gain and income-loss 
households and average income gain (between income-gain and in-
come loss). But, for the two periods, a standard method to determine 
which period had better income mobility cannot be established.  
A measure that allows standard assessment on income mobility was 
developed by Fields and Ok (1999a).  One of the F-O 3 set of measure is 
shown below.  
 
(3)
nm  (x, y) = ∑i=1 (log yi- log xi)/n (6) 
 
When using the real income, the income change rate using the log 
was designated as the standard index in order to keep the extent of in-
come change from worsening.  Then the income mobility direction of 
the two periods using the difference of income change rate at the aver-
age value was assessed.  The result showed 0.095 for before the crisis 
and 0.135 for after the crisis.  Hence, the income mobility during 
1995~1997 and 1998~2000 both showed move in the positive direction, 
meaning income mobility after the crisis was more positive then before 
the crisis.  
However, the positive result of m⑶ measure does not mean that the 
extent of income distribution of a society has improved, meaning an 
income distribution improvement of portions of income class in a soci-
ety does not affect the whole society’s income distribution.  Further-
more, although m⑶ measure represents the directional income mobility 
of a whole society but it does not represent individual’s income mobil-
ity direction or a particular group’s income mobility direction.   
Accordingly, in order to determine if the extent of income mobility 
for a particular group has improved for a given period of time, instead 
of using the total average, like m⑶ equation, first determining the extent 
of income mobility change of that particular group should be made.  In 
the graph using the real income, the emphasis (accumulative weight) 
was on the households with the most income loss during the two peri-
ods and if the income mobility of one period compared to the other pe-
riod is not positioned above (if at least one household falls below or in a 
same position) then it can be said that income distribution has im-
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proved.8  
In order to make a standard assessment on the income mobility di-
rection before and after the crisis, [Figure 1] and [Figure 2] was pre-
pared.  [Figure 1] was prepared using the log income difference and 
[Figure 2] by using the real income difference.  
As seen in [Figure 2], all income changes after the crisis showed 
downward direction compared to before the crisis, except for the lowest 
3% income mobility and the uppermost class.9  Except for the partial 
households with severe fluctuation in their income loss or gain, the in-
come mobility direction after the crisis is more positive compared to 
before the crisis but, we cannot show that the whole income distribu-
tion structure has improved. 
To explain the higher Gini Coefficient (which indicates worsening 
income inequality) shown in the KDI Income Panel (Urban Workers), 
using the income mobility results from the graph, it can be said that the 
amplitude of income mobility direction after the crisis was much 
greater than before the crisis. (Refer to <Table 6>)  More explanations 
on this issue is discussed in Chapter V. 
Putting all the results together and keeping in mind that the house-
holds indicated in the KDI Income Panel with increased income after 
the crisis fall under extremely small number, it can be said that the un-
derlying cause of worsening distribution structure after the crisis is due 
to the greater degree of income loss gap after the crisis for those house-
holds that already experienced income loss before the crisis.  In the fol-
lowing chapter, the cause of worsening distribution structure after the 
crisis was analyzed through households mentioned above.  
The result of standard evaluation on the income mobility direction 
obtained by analyzing the difference of real income axiomatically 
agrees10 when using the result from [Figure 1] as used in the equation 
(6), which uses the log value.  Therefore, in the next chapter not only the 
results from [Figure 1] but also the results from [Figure 2] will be used 
simultaneously to closely examine the characteristics of households 
with absolutely or relatively great income mobility after the crisis as the 
subject in understanding the underlying cause of worsening distribu-
tion structure. 
                                                          
8 This concept is similar to comparing two Lorenze curves to determine the extent of income 
inequality and income equality levels.  The value of horizontal axis of the graph denotes the degree 
of income changes from negative to positive arranging in order of biggest households.  The vertical 
axis denotes aggregate composition ratio of those households.  Here, we mean absolute value of 
income and not log income.  The comparison between the absolute income value and log income 
will be dealt in the next section. 
9 Not shown in the graph but households with above 3.1 million won income gain during 
1995~1997 did not show any income mobility change.  
10 Evidenced in Fields and Ok (1999a). 
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[Figure 2] Distribution of Income Mobility (real income) 
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V. Analysis on the Cause of Worsening Income  
Inequality after the Financial Crisis 
 
 
1. Focused on households with great absolute income 
mobility 
 
1-a. Analysis on the cause of worsening distribution  
structure 
 
Most of the previous studies conducted to understand the cause of 
distribution structure indicated that the cause of worsening distribution 
structure after the crisis mostly concentrated in the low-income or lower 
class (in this paper modest-income and low-income classes). [(Yoo 1999), 
(Jung, 2000), (Jung & Choi, 2001), Jung (2001)] 
Such static analysis result coincides with the distribution changes of 
income classes shown in (<Table 7> and <Table 8>) in Chapter Ⅱ of 
this paper, which also used a static method in their analysis. 
However, the analysis conducted in this paper, which is based on 
the dynamic analysis of income mobility by using the panel data, has 
following differences from the previous analysis results. 
As shown in [Figure 2], which displays the results of the income 
mobility direction before and after the crisis, the causes of worsening 
distribution structure after the crisis among urban worker households 
are mainly due to a sharp increase rate of income gain (above 3.1 mil-
lion won) before the crisis and a sudden decrease in household income 
after the crisis (above 1.1 million won based on 1997) fell even more 
after the crisis.11
As such, if majority of the households with great income-loss gap 
belongs to the low-income class and the same households moved to 
even lower class than it can be said this result is in accord with the re-
sults of previous static analysis.  In <Table 12> and <Table 13>, the re-
sults are shown. 
The income decile mobility of households that are presumed to have 
worsen the distribution structure due to substantial income-loss after 
the crisis all belong to the high-income class of the VII decile and above 
in 1998.  These households, which experienced considerable income-
loss in 2000, are also experiencing the change in their income class 
through various income deciles.  For example, the households belong-
ing to VII decile moved to I decile, households belonging to VIII decile 
to I and III deciles, and households belonging to IX decile to below VI  
                                                          
11 The standard value of 1.1 million won and 3.1 million won was derived from the two values 
that intersect on [Figure 1]. 
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<Table 12> 1999-2000 Income Decile Mobility of Households with 
Income-loss (more than 1.1 million won) 
(Unit: %) 
2000 
1998 Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ 
Ⅶ 4.11)100.02)
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅷ 6.0 100.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅸ 3.2 15.9 
4.2 
23.5 
5.2 
26.1 
6.9 
34.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅹ 6.8 9.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
2.8 
3.9 
8.0 
11.4 
14.7 
21.0 
9.8 
14.1 
8.8 
12.5 
8.9 
12.7 
10.3 
14.8 
Note: The ratio of households with more than 1.1 million won income-loss during 1998-
2000 was 2.7% of the total household (46 households). 
1) Ratio based on 46 households. 
2) Ratio based on the number of households in each income decile 1998 (raw percent). 
 
 
<Table 13> 1995-1997 Income Decile Mobility of Households with 
Income-loss (more than 1.1 million won) 
(Unit: %) 
1997 
1995 Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ 
Ⅶ 5.0 100.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅷ 1.7 30.8 
3.9 
69.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅸ 1.1 6.7 
5.8 
36.1 
4.0 
24.7 
3.0 
18.9 
2.2 
13.6 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅹ 1.5 2.1 
0.0 
0.0 
3.0 
4.2 
14.5 
19.8 
22.0 
30.0 
1.7 
2.3 
8.0 
11.0 
13.8 
18.9 
6.1 
8.3 
2.6 
3.6 
Note: The ratio of household with more than 1.1 million income-loss during 1995-1997 was 
2.7% of the total household (51 households) 
1) Ratio based on 51 households. 
2) Ratio based on the number of households in each income decile 1995 (raw percent). 
 
decile, experiencing severe changes in income decile in 1998.  In particu-
lar, the households that belonged to X decile in 1998 experienced in-
come class mobility through various income deciles. 
Accordingly, the argument supported by the static analysis, which 
states that the fundamental cause of worsening income distribution 
structure after the crisis is the collapse of lower-income class cannot be 
proved by the dynamic analysis.  
In addition, the basis for questions raised and opposing arguments 
of the previous analysis relating to the collapse of middle class cannot 
be affirmed by neither the dynamic nor static analysis results, hence we 
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can conclude that it is not true.12
The conclusion of this study will be conducted by using a dynamic 
analysis to investigate the characteristics of households with great in-
come-loss and the notable characteristics are as follows.  The worsening 
income distribution of urban worker households before and after the 
crisis showed greater extent of income mobility after the crisis and ac-
cordingly, the households with considerable income-gain increased 
after the crisis.  Moreover, households with substantial income-loss be-
fore the crisis experienced greater income-loss gap after the crisis even-
tually leading to worsened distribution structure.   
   
1-b. Analysis on characteristics of households with income-
loss  
 
In <Table 14> and <Table 15> households with considerable in-
come-loss for 3 years before and after the crisis were analyzed on their 
income changes by household type. 
In observing the characteristic differences between the two periods, 
first for those households that experienced income-loss after the crisis, 
46.9% of the income-loss was due to the loss in non-current income.  
Comparing this to 12.7% recorded before the crisis, a notable difference 
can be seen.  Non-current income includes incomes other than current 
income such as money received for special occasions, free giveaways 
and lottery, lump sum pension and retirement payment, and scholar-
ship funds.  It is presumed that the income loss seen after the crisis is 
mainly due to the income gain from retirement payment received im-
mediately following the crisis in 1998 as part of a vigorous restructuring, 
that gradually reduced in 2000.  If this assumption is correct then this is 
considered as a temporary decline and will not further worsen the dis-
tribution structure in the future.   
On the other hand, the ratio of current income loss from the total in-
come loss after the crisis was 53.1% and the ratio of earned income loss 
was 48.8%, which is approximately half of the total income loss.  Look-
ing at the breakdown of earned income loss after the crisis, 23% was 
due to income loss of household head, 11.6% spouse, and 14.1% due to 
others.  In addition, during the period before the crisis the ratio of  
                                                          
12 The households with absolute income-loss of 1.1 million won are naturally the households 
with above VII deciles meaning high-income households accordingly, there are no low-income 
households with income-loss of 1.1 million won.  Hence, the argument of this paper, which dis-
agrees with the theory that states worsening income inequality, is due to the collapse of low-income 
class does not have any basis which can support its argument.  But, in the next chapter, the relative 
income increase using the log income is identical to the findings in this study hence the results from 
this study is considered valid.  In order to justify the existing theory that the collapse of the low-
income truly is the reason for increase in income inequality, you cannot find an answer from static 
analysis, but a dynamic analysis must be conducted.  The results gained from using the log income, 
which was used in this paper seem most effective.     
 <Table 14> Income Source of Households with Income Loss in 1995~ 1997 (more than 1.1 million won) 
(Unit: 1,000 won, %) 
1995 1997 Ratio of Income Difference  Income 
Amount Ratio 
Income 
Amount Ratio 
Income 
Difference 
(97-95) Based on Total Income 
Based on 
Income 
Increase 
Rate 
(97-95) 
Total Income 5,482.9 100.0 3,854.6      100.0 -1,628.3 100.0 - -29.7
Income         3,603.1 65.7 1,771.0 45.9 -1,832.2 112.5 100.0 -50.8
Current Income 3,236.7 59.0 1,637.0      42.5 -1,599.7 98.2 87.3 -49.4
Earned Income 2,894.8 52.8 1,492.2      38.7 -1,402.6 86.1 76.6 -48.5
Household Heads 1,714.5 31.3 1,184.7      30.7 -529.8 32.5 28.9 -30.9
Spouse         450.9 8.2 152.4 4.0 -298.5 18.3 16.3 -66.2
Others        729.4 155.113.3 4.0 -574.3 35.3 31.3 -78.7
Self-employed & Subsidiary Jobs 120.3        2.2 47.8 1.2 -72.5 4.5 4.0 -60.3
Property Income         58.7 1.1 50.4 1.3 -8.3 0.5 0.5 -14.1
Transfer Income 163.0 3.0 46.6      1.2 -116.4 7.1 6.4 -71.4
Non-current Income 366.5 6.7 134.0      3.5 -232.4 14.3 12.7 -63.4
Other Income 1,564.4 28.5 1,837.9      47.7 273.5 -16.8 - 17.5
Transfer from Last Month 315.3 5.8 245.7 6.4 -69.6 4.3 - -22.1 
Number of Employed 2.4 1.5 - 
Ave. Age of Household Heads 40.4 40.5 - 
 <Table 15> Income Source of Households with Income Loss in 1998~2000 (more than 1.1 million won) 
(Unit: 1,000 won, %) 
1998 2000 Ratio of Income Difference  Income 
Amount Ratio 
Income 
Amount Ratio 
Income 
Difference 
(2000-1998) Based on  Total Income 
Based on 
Income 
Increase 
Rate 
(2000-
1998) 
Total Income 7,051.2 100.0 4,235.1      100.0 -2,816.1 100.0 - -39.9
Income      4,013.0 1,766.756.9 41.7 -2,246.3 79.8 100.0 -56.0
 Account Income 2,859.3 40.6 1,666.8      39.4 -1,192.5 42.3 53.1 -41.7
   Earned Income 2,383.4 33.8 1,286.6      30.4 -1,096.8 38.9 48.8 -46.0
     Household Heads 1,619.2 23.0       1,101.8 26.0 -517.4 18.4 23.0 -32.0
     Spouse 298.3 4.2 36.7 0.9 -261.6 9.3 11.6 -87.7 
     Other 465.9 6.6 148.1 3.5 -317.8 11.3 14.1 -68.2 
Self-employed & Subsidiary  Jobs 176.6        2.5 127.7 3.0 -48.9 1.7 2.2 -27.7
   Property Income 166.0 2.4 150.4 3.6 -15.7 0.6 0.7 -9.4 
   Transfer Income 133.3 1.9       102.2 2.4 -31.1 1.1 1.4 -23.4
 Non-current Income 1,153.6 16.4 99.8      2.4 -1,053.8 37.4 46.9 -91.3
Other Income 2,778.8 39.4 2,241.2      52.9 -537.6 19.1 - -19.3
Transfer from Last Month 259.4 3.7 227.3 5.4 -32.2 1.1 - -12.4 
Number of Employed 2.1 1.5 - 
Ave. Age of Household Heads 47.3 46.5 -  
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<Table 16> Income Decile Mobility of Households with Income Gain 
in 1998~2000 (more than 3.1 million won) 
(Unit: %) 
1998 
2000 Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ 
Ⅹ 8.1 2.6 1.9 2.5 10.6 30.9 29.3 14.2 
 
earned income decline among the income decline was 76.6% and by 
type, household heads was 28.9%, spouse 16.3%, and others 31.3%.  
Now, looking at the period before the crisis, the ratio of earned income 
loss from the total income loss was 76.6%, and the breaking down con-
sists of 28.9% income loss of household heads, 16.3% spouse, and 31.3% 
others.   
In conclusion, the main cause of income loss before and after the cri-
sis is due to a decrease in the number of employed persons per house-
hold (both periods showed approximately 2.1~2.4 average employed 
persons per household dropping to 1.5 persons).  For instance, the 
households with considerable income loss experienced unemployment 
within the household with decreased shares of members in employ-
ment both before and after the crisis leading to a decrease in earned 
income which is the main cause of overall income loss.     
Although the same households with substantial income loss were 
observed on the Panel data, considering that there was no significant 
change in the average age of household heads both before and after the 
crisis, we can infer that there was notable number of households with 
the change in their household heads.  Directly validating the change 
will be difficult however we can assume that number of households 
experienced split in the family or death of household heads, which both 
decreased the shares of family members in employment.    
 
1-c. Analysis on characteristics of households with income 
gain after the crisis 
 
As one of the causes for worsening income distribution after the cri-
sis, observing the income decile mobility of households with more than 
3.1 million won income gain for 3 years after the crisis are as follows.  
Although the number of sample is small and maybe insignificant, 
looking at the income decile mobility among the households dispersed 
between the deciles III to X in 1998, these households moved upward to 
the X decile, highest income class, in 2000.  Among the households that 
were in the deciles VIII and IX in 1998, 60% have moved upward to the 
X decile in 2000. 
Moreover, looking at the characteristic changes in the income type of 
these households, 77% of upward income decile movement was due to 
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non-current income gain and 22.7% was due to current income gain, 
although only 20 households are analyzed casting a shadow on the 
credibility. 
Noting that for the past two years the average age of household 
head was the same affirms that the same households are being sampled.  
Moreover, the number of employed persons per household which was 
1.3 in 1998 slightly increased to 1.5 persons in 2000.  However, as ex-
plain in the previous sections the majority of upward movement in in-
come decile for 3 years after the crisis was due to a non-current income 
gain hence the greater shares of members in employment per house-
hold does not play a crucial role in income gain.  
Also, considering the fact that the average age of household heads is 
in their late 30’s and the non-current income gain, we can presume the 
income gain of these households, similar to those households with in-
come loss, is due to increased retirement payment, etc.13  On the other 
hand, the “Venture Boom” dividends and shares from stock investment 
maybe be one of the reasons for income gain however, due to KNSO’s 
insufficient data on property income a direct evidence cannot be ob-
tained.14  
 
 
2. Centered on households with relatively large income 
mobility 
 
2-a. Analysis on the cause of worsening distribution structure 
 
The income mobility direction before and after the crisis as analyzed 
in [Figure 1], the main cause of worsening distribution structure of the 
urban worker households is due to a sharp income gain ratio before the 
crisis and a rapid income loss ratio after the crisis have become greater 
after the financial crisis.    
Reviewing the income decile mobility of households with great drop 
in the log income after the crisis, which is thought to have worsen the 
distribution structure after the crisis even more than before the crisis as 
shown in <Table 18>, 12.2% of these households occurred below II dec-
ile (low-income and modest-income class), 52.8% between III and VIII 
deciles, 35.1% in IX and X deciles.  And further, figures for before the 
crisis as shown in <Table 19>, are 8.1%, 53.8%, and 38.2%, respectively. 
The occurrence rate of households with substantial drop in log in-
come after the crisis in the low-income and modest-income classes in-
creased by 4%p after the crisis and the rest of the households at around  
                                                          
13 In 2000, mid-settlement of retirement payment was widely enforced.  Hence, the number of 
employed may not decrease but, retirement payment can greatly increase. 
14 It is presumed that the majority of respondents for the survey is housewives hence, precise 
reflection on the change in financial income will be difficult. 
 <Table 17> Income Source of Households with Income Gain In 1998~2000(more than 3.1 million won) 
(Unit: 1,000 Won, %) 
1998 2000 Ratio of Income Difference  
Income 
Amount Ratio 
Income 
Amount Ratio 
Income 
Difference 
(2000-1998) Based on 
Total Income 
Based on 
Income 
Increase Rate 
(2000-1998) 
Total Income 4,103.7 100.0 13,453.6      100 9,349.9 100 - 227.8
Income        2,267.4 8,218.655.3 61.1 5,951.2 63.6 100.0 262.5
 Current Income 2,175.5 53.0 3,525.0      26.2 1,349.5 14.4 22.7 62.0
   Earned Income 2,077.2 50.6       3,127.0 23.2 1,049.8 11.2 17.6 50.5
     Household Heads 1,835.3 44.7       2,739.9 20.4 904.5 9.7 15.2 49.3
     Spouse 237.9 5.8 259.6      1.9 21.6 0.2 0.4 9.1
     Other 3.9 0.1 127.5      0.9 123.6 1.3 2.1 3,146.4
Self-employed & Subsidiary  Jobs         39.0 1.0 143.9 1.1 104.9 1.1 1.8 269.1
   Property Income 29.8 0.7 16.4      0.1 -13.4 -0.1 -0.2 -45.1
   Transfer Income 29.6 0.7       237.8 1.8 208.2 2.2 3.5 704.3
  Non-current Income 91.9 2.2 4,693.6      34.9 4,601.7 49.2 77.3 5,007.0
Other Income 1,628.7 39.7 5,021.8      37.3 3,393.0 36.3 - 208.3
Transfer from Last Month 207.5        5.1 213.2 1.6 5.7 0.1 - 2.7
Number of Employed 1.3 1.5 - 
Ave. Age of Household Heads 37.7 39.7 - 
Note: Taking into consideration the ratio of households with income gain of above 3.1 million won during 1998~2000, which equaled 20 households. 
(1% of the total households). 
 <Table 18> 1998~2000 Distribution of Households with Considerable Drop in Log Income 
(Unit: %) 
 Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ 
 
 
6.11)
100.02)
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅱ 6.1 100.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅲ 9.9 86.4 
1.6 
13.6 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅳ 2.6 48.1 
2.8 
51.9 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅴ 2.5 33.9 
3.7 
50.8 
1.1 
15.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅵ 0.3 4.1 
3.2 
42.8 
3.7 
48.5 
0.4 
4.6 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅶ 1.2 8.6 
0.2 
1.8 
2.3 
16.7 
7.7 
56.8 
2.2 
16.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅷ 1.3 17.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.2 
3.0 
2.6 
34.4 
2.4 
30.7 
1.1 
14.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅸ 0.7 5.4 
1.0 
8.0 
1.1 
8.9 
2.0 
15.3 
2.6 
19.9 
3.5 
27.3 
2.0 
15.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
 
0.0 
Ⅹ 1.5 6.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.6 
2.7 
1.7 
7.9 
3.2 
14.5 
3.3 
14.8 
4.0 
18.0 
4.1 
18.3 
3.8 
17.3 
Note: 211 households showed more than 0.24 drop in their log income in 1998~2000 (12.3% of total households). 
1) The ratio based on 211 households. 
2) The ratio based on the number of households belonging to each income decile in 1998 (raw percent). 
 <Table 19> 1995~97 Distribution of Households with Considerable Drop in Log Income 
(Unit : %) 
1997 
1995 Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ 
Ⅰ 3.31)100.02)
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅱ 4.8 100.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅲ 7.0 95.2 
0.4 
4.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅳ 6.7 78.3 
1.9 
21.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅴ 1.4 14.3 
6.0 
59.8 
2.6 
25.9 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅵ 0.1 2.4 
1.4 
26.3 
3.9 
71.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅶ 2.1 21.5 
2.2 
22.8 
2.4 
24.4 
3.1 
31.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅷ 0.4 3.0 
1.4 
11.2 
2.2 
17.6 
3.5 
27.8 
3.9 
30.5 
1.3 
9.9 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅸ 0.2 1.3 
1.3 
7.2 
0.9 
4.9 
2.3 
13.0 
4.7 
26.0 
6.9 
38.7 
1.6 
9.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ⅹ 0.3 1.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.7 
3.3 
3.2 
15.9 
4.9 
24.1 
0.4 
1.8 
2.7 
13.1 
4.6 
22.7 
2.6 
13.0 
0.9 
4.4 
Note: 231 households showed more than 0.24 drop in their log income in 1995~1997 (12.3% of the total households). 
1) The ratio based on 231 households. 
2) The ratio based on the number of households belonging to each income decile in 1995 (raw percent). 
 
 <Table 20> Analysis on the Degree of Income Mobility of Each Income Class  
(Unit: won) 
Index 
Income Class Period 
d⑴ g⑴ t⑴
1995∼1997 131,757,997 (100.0%) 
106,254,711 
(80.6%) 
25,503,286 
(19.4%) Low Income 
(Ⅰ,Ⅱ Decile) 
1997∼2000 112,351,820 (100.0%) 
92,771,642 
(82.6%) 
19,580,178 
(17.4%) 
1995∼1997 503,801,459 (100.0%) 
264,088,384 
(52.4%) 
239,713,076 
(47.6%) Middle Income 
(Ⅲ∼Ⅷ Decile) 
1997∼2000 554,617,078 (100.0%) 
369,850,190 
(66.7%) 
184,766,888 
(33.3%) 
1995∼1997 298,396,030 (100.0%) 
10,954,458 
(3.7%) 
287,441,572 
(96.3%) High Income 
(Ⅸ,Ⅹ Decile) 
1997∼2000 391,984,046 (100.0%) 
73,223,506 
(18.7%) 
318,760,540 
(81.3%) 
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90% ratio. Hence, the static analysis presented in the introduction of this 
paper, which argues that the worsening distribution after the crisis 
mainly occurred in the low-income class cannot be supported.  
<Table 20> analyzes various indices on income mobility according 
to each income class shown in ChapterⅣ. 
First, using the equation (5) in Chapter 4, income mobility of each 
income class (d(1)) is separated into growth component and transfer 
component.  Looking at the income mobility of low-income class before 
the crisis, 81% was due to the growth component and 19% due to the 
transfer component and after the crisis 83% due to the growth compo-
nent and 17% due to the transfer component. 
Accordingly, the income gain of low-income class after the crisis due 
to the economic growth component showed slightly higher absolute 
value compared to before the crisis but the ratio was relatively high.  
Again it would be unjustifiable to state that the growth component ratio 
of low-income class was greater than the growth component ratio of 
middle and high-income classes hence, the worsening income distribu-
tion concentrated in the low-income class after the crisis.  
 
2-b. Analysis on characteristics of households with log in-
come loss by income type  
 
<Table 21> and <Table 22> analyzed households with considerable 
loss in log income by their household type for 3 years before and after 
the crisis.  
Here, as indicated in the previous pages, a temporary cause such as 
a decrease in non-current income (reduction in retirement payment) 
after the crisis and decrease in the number of employed persons are 
seen both before and after the crisis.15 
 
2-c. Characteristic analysis on households with log income 
gain after the crisis 
 
The characteristics of households with log income gain after the cri-
sis do not show any particular difference from the households with ab-
solute income gain therefore it is omitted.  
 
 
3. Conclusion of Chapter V 
 
As pointed out in this paper, the causes that worsened the extent of 
income inequality after the crisis for both periods are the decrease in  
                                                          
15 The basis for 0.24 log income in <Table 21> and <Table 22>, is the log income value taken 
at the intersecting point of two graphs in [Figure 2]. 
 <Table 21> 1995~1997 Income Source of Households with Log Income Loss (above 0.24) 
(Unit: 1,000 won, %) 
1995 1997 Ratio of Income Difference  Income 
Amount Ratio 
Income 
Amount Ratio 
Income 
Difference 
(97~95) Based on Total Income 
Based on 
Income 
Total Income 3,465.9 100.0 2,656.8     100.0 -809.1 100.0 -
Income        2,281.0 65.8 1,401.9 52.8 -879.0 108.6 100.0
  Current Income 2,093.9 60.4      1,313.0 49.4 -780.9 96.5 88.8
    Earned Income 1,862.3 53.7      1,188.6 44.7 -673.7 83.3 76.6
      Household Heads 1,238.1       35.7 984.6 37.1 -253.5 31.3 28.8
      Spouse 243.6 7.0 89.0 3.4 -154.6 19.1 17.6 
      Others 380.6 11.0 114.9 4.3 -265.6 32.8 30.2 
Self-employed & Subsidiary jobs        94.2 2.7 38.6 1.5 -55.5 6.9 6.3
    Property Income 45.1 1.3 34.5 1.3 -10.5 1.3 1.2 
    Transfer Income 92.4 2.7 51.3 1.9 -41.1 5.1 4.7 
  Non-current Income 187.1 5.4 88.9 3.3 -98.1 12.1 11.2 
Other Income 877.4 25.3 1,000.8 37.7 123.3 -15.2 - 
Transfer from Last Month 307.5 8.9 254.1 9.6 -53.4 6.6 - 
Number of Employed 1.9 1.4 - 
Ave. Age of Household Heads 41.7 42.2 - 
 <Table 22> 1998~2000 Income Source of Households with Log Income Loss (above 0.24) 
(Unit: 1,000 won, %) 
1998 2000 Ratio of Income Difference  Income 
Amount Ratio 
Income 
Amount Ratio 
Income 
Difference 
(2000-98) Based on Total Income 
Based on 
Income 
Total Income 3,637.0 100.0 2,745.1     100.0 -891.9 100.0 -
Income        2,179.7 59.9 1,261.4 46.0 -918.3 103.0 100.0
  Current Income 1,841.8 50.6      1,195.7 43.6 -646.0 72.4 70.4
    Earned Income 1,630.4       44.8 992.4 36.2 -638.0 71.5 69.5
      Household Heads 1,151.0       31.6 847.1 30.9 -303.9 34.1 33.1
      Spouse 190.6 5.2 63.8 2.3 -126.8 14.2 13.8 
      Others 288.7 7.9 81.4 3.0 -207.3 23.2 22.6 
Self-employed & Subsidiary Jobs        73.7 2.0 55.4 2.0 -18.3 2.0 2.0
    Property Income 72.5 2.0 68.8 2.5 -3.7 0.4 0.4 
    Transfer Income 65.2 1.8 79.1 2.9 14.0 -1.6 -1.5 
  Non-current Income 337.9 9.3 65.7 2.4 -272.2 30.5 29.6 
Other Income 1,213.3 33.4 1,286.3 46.9 73.0 -8.2 - 
Transfer from Last Month 244.0 6.7 197.3 7.2 -46.7 5.2 - 
Number of Employed 1.8 1.4 - 
Ave. Age of Household Heads 44.3 45.2 -  
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absolute income and log income.  In this section, the previous findings 
on households with considerable decline in absolute and log incomes 
are re-examined. 
Reasons that income distribution structure worsened after the crisis 
compared to the period before the crisis are first, reduction in non-
current income (mainly a decrease in retirement payment) among 
households with income loss, second, reduction in earned income led 
by reduction in the number of employed persons among households 
with income loss, and third, although not proven, increase in financial 
income due to an increase in non-current income (again mainly retire-
ment payment) among households with income gain.   
The first reason is believed to be a temporary factor resulting from a 
massive restructuring process during the financial crisis and will not 
leave lasting effect on the distribution structure in the future however, 
the third reason, the increased financial income due to development in 
the IT industry and its structural factors will surely continue to play an 
antagonizing role on the worsening income distribution in the future.16
Furthermore, the asymmetric characteristic shown by both increase 
and decrease in income mobility due to an increase in the number of 
employed persons is common.  In the case of households with consid-
erable income loss after the crisis, the decrease in the number of em-
ployed persons per household is an influential factor however, for the 
households with considerable income gain, the increase in the number 
of employed persons per household does not affect the outcome.  
 
 
VI. Tasks to Improve Income Distribution 
 
 
1. Constructing a statistical data basis to accurately de-
termine income inequality 
 
As explained in the beginning of this paper, the research aim of this 
study was to analyze the cause of fluctuating income distribution and 
worsening income inequality after the crisis focusing on the earned in-
comes of urban worker households.  Hence, incomes of wage-earning 
households in non-urban regions, self-employed, and no-occupation 
households are not included in this research. 
Moreover, keep in mind that the analyses on the trends and distribu-
tion structure is conducted under certain limitations and in order to 
draw more in-depth analyses and policy measures more thorough 
analysis on income related statistics other than urban household report 
is urgently needed.   Although it is believed that the expanded number 
                                                          
16 Indicated as Digital Divide 
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of membership to the four major social insurances and the extension of 
social safety net following the Minimum Living Standard Act of Octo-
ber 2000 have made an positive impact on the parts of distribution 
structure however, it is unfortunate that with the existing analyses it is 
not possible to validate the effects of income redistribution policy. 
In particular, immediately after the crisis, the income loss experi-
enced by the unemployed households following a sharp increase in the 
unemployment rate most likely have greatly affected the income distri-
bution structure but as mentioned in Chapter Ⅱ, when the incomes of 
these households are set at zero in the analysis due to data unavailabil-
ity, the problem of overestimating the extent of income inequality may 
occur while leaving them out would lead to underestimation.  At the 
current stage, there are no other appropriate methods to handle this 
situation hence the method used by KNSO in which these households 
are excluded from the analysis of income inequality is used.  Due to this 
discrepancy, it is possible that the extent of worsening income inequal-
ity after the crisis is somewhat underestimated.  It will be an extra effort 
on KNSO’s part however, if the income levels excluding the earned in-
come of no-occupation or unemployed households are surveyed and 
published then this will be a crucial data in formulating the future pol-
icy measures as well as understanding the trends of income distribution. 
Meanwhile, although the property income and financial income are 
included in the statistics of urban worker household data but there is a 
high possibility that the respondents will under-report these incomes.  
Therefore, the distribution structure changes reflected by either prop-
erty or financial income are not reliable.  Lee & Lee (2001) using the 
Daewoo Panel data, which closely examines both property and finan-
cial incomes showed that the Gini Coefficient before the crisis (1997) 
was 0.363 and immediately after the crisis (1998) was 0.396.  Lee & Lee 
showed notably increased inequality in household income after the cri-
sis in their report.17
Looking at these facts, if property or financial incomes are correctly 
estimated the current situation may be worse than the results shown by 
the existing data on income inequality after the crisis.  In Chapter Ⅴ, 
this same problem was identified as one of the causes of worsening dis-
tribution structure. 
No one will deny that fully understanding not only the earned in-
come but also the property and financial incomes will be the most pri-
oritized task in improving distribution structure.  Unless the actual 
conditions are understood in all respects any efforts to improve distri-
bution structure and establish policy measures will be illogical.  Also, it 
is a serious problem when solution measures that have been recom-
                                                          
17 Dawoo Panel data was discontinued after 1999 and hence additional analysis was impos-
sible. 
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mended over several decades are not effective. 
In order to thoroughly investigate income, it must be connected to 
the tax system hence compiling materials centered on the National Tax 
Service (NTS) and publishing them is a must.  It goes same for the prob-
lems concerning the self-employed households.  Problems with health 
insurance fee collection and the assertion that salaried households are 
disadvantaged in the National Pension system all arise due to the fact 
that incomes of self-employed households are not fully investigated 
first.  NTS should first consolidate materials from national pension or 
national health insurance and use this information as the foundation for 
collecting tax and insurance premiums.  Then publish this information 
making sure that no personal information will be exposed.  For those 
against publicizing the information though anonymity is guaranteed 
appropriate measures must be taken under the Freedom of Information 
Act.  
Keep in mind that without a firm foundation of distribution data in-
troducing measures to improve distribution structure is like building a 
castle on the sand.   
Accordingly, in order to compile statistics relating to distribution, 
conduct cause analysis, and establish solution measures for the 
distribution problems, operating so called ‘Income Statistics 
Improvement Committee’ composed of experts on income distribution 
affiliated with the「Committee of Economic and Social Affairs」at all 
times is essential. 
 
 
2.  Thesis on distribution philosophy 
 
There are two basic types of policy framework concerning distribu-
tion structure in other countries, the Northern European framework, 
and the UK and US framework.  Under the Northern European type, 
the prime objective of the policies is to reduce the income gap because 
under their income inequality perspective, the worsening income dis-
tribution structure will damage social cohesion.  Completely opposite 
from the former, under the UK and US framework, problems relating to 
absolute poverty are mainly administered by the government and the 
rest is left up to the due course of market competition.  
The underlying basis for both of these policy frameworks originate 
from the past experience in wholly understanding the nature of distri-
bution policy to make trade-off between growth or distribution, choos-
ing one or the other. 
Currently, our interest lies with improving the income distribution 
by finding a mutual solution between redistribution and continuing 
stable growth.  Citing Yoo (1999), the following are the evaluation on 
the above opinion. 
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The argument stating ‘redistribution policy reduces growth,’ is a ba-
sis for Kaldor’s theory.  The precondition for growth is high savings 
rate and in general, the high-income class has the high marginal pro-
pensity to save hence, the theory that argues redistribution policy will 
reduce savings and to the end reduce growth and distort economic in-
centives are based on this traditional theory.  But, the spreading theory 
on growth and distribution eliminates the mutual relationship between 
capital market failure and income distribution.  For example, the aspect 
that the low-income class lacks collateral to secure loans in the capital 
market loosing opportunities to invest in human capital and lead to 
growth reduction will be eliminated.  According to this theory, if the 
capital market fails there is a possibility that income redistribution pol-
icy will stimulate growth through human capital accumulation of the 
low-income class.  Moreover, redistribution policy through tax and 
transfer system may hamper accumulation of human capital through-
out the whole society however it may help formation of human capital 
in the low-income class therefore it is difficult to identify uniformed net 
effect on growth.  Moreover, under an extreme condition of distribution 
structure, limited redistribution policy, and capital market failure, a 
redistribution policy through tax and transfer system is judged to 
stimulate growth.  Furthermore, instead of using indirect channels to 
help formation of human capital accumulation in low-income class, by 
selecting specific groups within the low-income class to give direct as-
sistance such as education subsidy, financing education, etc. will stimu-
late growth through redistribution policy. 
This indicates that distribution should be considered after growth.  
When distribution is first considered, this will be accompanied by both 
uncertainties and reduction in ‘incentive to work’ for the specific 
groups.  Hence the problem of absolute poverty should be dealt on a 
minimum level while through activating market competition protect 
workers and assert limited government intervention in case of market 
failure.  However, there are numerous distribution philosophies and 
policy directions other than the ones mentioned in this paper hence fur-
ther research into this area is necessary.  
The above-mentioned views share mutual connection with theory 
presented below, which states that creation of jobs and distribution 
have inverse relationship.  
 
 
3. Creation of jobs 
 
When considering the facts such as the data used above underesti-
mates the worsening effect of income distribution due to exclusion of 
no-occupation and unemployed households, and the decrease in num-
ber of employed persons per household are the major causes of worsen-
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ing distribution structure, it is clear that increasing employment should 
take precedence in order to improve distribution structure in the future.  
This is in accordance with the findings of Yoo (1999).  Having based on 
the following theory, his study indicates that the start of distribution 
structure improvement is expansion of employment. 
According to Yoo (1999), in the case of advanced countries, the re-
duction of unemployment through restructuring of labor market and 
the worsening income distribution have positive correlation.  In addi-
tion, though weak, the increase in employment and the worsening in-
come distribution also have positive correlation (OECD [1996]).  Al-
though restructuring the overall labor market may worsen the income 
distribution, depending on the relative relationship between the em-
ployment effect, which improves the extent of inequality by having jobs, 
and the income effect, which worsens the extent of inequality as income 
gap expands the direction of income distribution may change.  This 
emphasizes that the extent of income inequality varies depending on 
the subject under consideration.   
By using <Table 23> derived from OECD (1996) research, the extent 
of income inequality was measured using full-time workers.  The U.S. 
showed higher extent of inequality among full-time workers compared 
to the European countries however when considering the purchasing 
power parity, the average income level of low-income class was much 
higher in the U.S. than the European countries except for the Nether-
lands.  What is more, the extent of inequality in working age population of 
the U.S. is much lower than the European countries hence, it can be said 
that the employment effect exceeds the income effect when considering 
income inequality.  Moreover, providing jobs is the most important al-
leviating factor for the degree of inequality among low-income class 
hence, there is a possibility that trade-off between the extent of income 
inequality and increase in employment may not occur. 
Accordingly, in order to improve the distribution structure in the fu-
ture through a continuous economic growth cultivate job absorption 
and at the same time introduce various systems to advocate incentives 
to work rather than offering welfare measures that give free support.18 
 
 
4.  Supplementing the Minimum Living Standard Law 
 
The current Minimum Living Standard Act, which was established 
to protect the low-income class, is an appropriate system in terms of 
protecting the livelihood of income classes under absolute poverty level.  
As previously mentioned, the income redistribution policy (expanding 
membership to the 4 major social insurances, executing the Minimum  
                                                          
18 Detailed methodology on creating jobs is dealt in Yoo (2000). 
 <Table 23> Comparative Study on Individual and Household Labor Income: Country and Period 
 
 1980 (MLD Level) 
1990 
(MLD Level) 
Change Rate 
(1980-90) 
1990 
Rating 
Individual Income (annual): Full-time Workers 
 US (1979~1991) 
 Germany (1984~1992) 
 Canada (1981~1991) 
 Netherlands (1983~1991) 
 Sweden (1981~1992) 
 
0.14 
0.15 
0.15 
- 
0.08 
 
0.17 
0.12 
0.16 
0.09 
0.11 
 
+17.6 
-18.1 
+5.9 
- 
+34.9 
 
1 
3 
2 
5 
4 
Individual Income: All workers 
 US (1979~1991) 
 Germany (1984~1991) 
 Canada (1981~1991) 
 Netherlands (1983~1991) 
 Sweden (1981~1992) 
 
0.47 
0.27 
0.45 
0.16 
0.16 
 
0.47 
0.27 
0.46 
0.25 
0.22 
 
-1.0 
-1.8 
+2.1 
+62.1 
+38.5 
 
1 
3 
2 
4 
5 
Individual Income: Working Age Population 
 US (1979~1991) 
 Germany (1984~1991) 
 Canada (1981~1991) 
 Netherlands (1983~1991) 
 Sweden (1981~1992) 
 
1.41 
1.50 
1.26 
2.15 
0.61 
 
1.25 
1.38 
1.19 
1.67 
0.77 
 
-11.0 
-8.1 
+5.5 
-22.1 
+27.5 
 
3 
2 
4 
1 
5 
Household Income: Working Age Population 
 US (1979~1991) 
 Canada (1981~1991) 
 Netherlands (1983~1991) 
 Sweden (1981~1992) 
 
0.59 
0.88 
1.21 
0.35 
 
0.66 
0.68 
0.97 
0.54 
 
+13.3 
-22.8 
-19.8 
+54.8 
 
3 
2 
1 
4 
Note: MLD (mean log deviation) index denotes the difference between log income and average log income.  Compared to Gini Coefficient and other 
indices, income distribution of low-income class is carefully reflected. 
Source:  OECD (1996). [quoted from Yoo (1999)] 
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Living Standard Act, etc.) of the government after the crisis is presumed 
to have provided positive influence on the changing distribution struc-
ture.  However, the effectiveness of government policies is not being 
measured due to data unavailability.  Therefore, in depth discussions 
on the extent of direction of income redistribution policy is not being 
established. 
As with all policies, there is a critical need for improvement on prob-
lems that arise before and after the implementation of a policy.  
The two problems that were pointed out before initiating the Mini-
mum Living Standard Act was one, insufficient information on incomes 
of the low-income class can lead to the possibility of excluding or in-
cluding wrong households and second, the decline in ‘incentive to 
work’ for recipients and income-class immediately above the benefici-
ary class due to government subsidies that are given out according to 
the difference (minimum living expense minus personal income).  
It is believed these two problems still exist at the enforcement stage.  
Although a great manpower (experts on social welfare) was added to 
gather information so that an accurate determination can be made on 
the incomes of low-income class but, due to various circumstances there 
are still numbers of households that should be included as recipients19 
and problems with unjust payments occur frequently.  It is estimated 
that these problems will gradually be solved however, without a thor-
ough understanding of the incomes of low-income class there will be 
limitations.  
Second, the problems with advocating ‘incentive to work’ should be 
more seriously and cautiously dealt with.  The Minimum Living Stan-
dard Act was put in place in order to counter the rapidly growing un-
employment rate and to protect the livelihood of the low-income class.  
The primary goal of this Law is to provide support to those households 
earning less than absolute income, regardless of household head’s abil-
ity to work or age.  Accordingly, although a household may have 
earned income if it earns less than the minimum cost of living the gov-
ernment provides the difference.  If earned income increases in a 
household the government subsidy (benefit amount) will decrease cor-
respondingly to the household income, additionally reducing ‘incentive 
to work.’  This will work to reduce the market participation by unem-
ployed as well as their spouses inducing so called ‘poverty trap’ among 
the low-income class.  As such, measures that exempt portions of 
earned income and other incomes from the fixed income amount is in-
corporated into this Law.  But, the scope of this measure is small and 
this will not go into effect until 2002, hence at this point, it is not in ef-
                                                          
19 Households listed as having dependent family but have a run-a-way or missing family 
members; or low-income person with high financial income but in reality someone else has 
borrowed his/her identity. 
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fect.  In other countries, such measures generally led to ‘welfare trap’ 
hence they were either discontinued or converted to new income de-
duction measures that advocated ‘incentive to work.’20 
In order to promote ‘incentive to work,’ limit benefit period or set a 
specific time limit to receive government subsidy and then after cutback 
on the subsidy amount for those households with ability to work.  In 
addition, the income deduction system must be put in place by 2002, 
and the deduction rate must be adjusted upward from the current 
10~15%, since this rate is insufficient. 
                                                          
20 AFDC or TANF of the U.S. are two most representative cases. 
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Appendix 
 
 
■Annual 10 Income Deciles on Average Monthly Income of 
Households(Applied quarterly Consumer Price Index (95=100) 
 
1) Total Data based on Households  
(Unit: 1,000 won) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Ⅰ 664.7 713.1 723.1 542.9 551.3 601.0 
Ⅱ 1,014.8 1,064.0 1,081.0 847.4 848.4 900.3 
Ⅲ 1,221.0 1,278.2 1,321.2 1,035.4 1,057.4 1,108.3 
Ⅳ 1,401.4 1,473.9 1,525.9 1,213.9 1,253.0 1,296.9 
Ⅴ 1,583.5 1,672.8 1,721.1 1,396.8 1,427.7 1,484.0 
Ⅵ 1,766.6 1,888.3 1,933.2 1,597.7 1,638.8 1,708.6 
Ⅶ 1,992.4 2,139.8 2,192.1 1,813.6 1,873.1 1,948.7 
Ⅷ 2,247.9 2,444.6 2,502.8 2,095.5 2,185.7 2,268.7 
Ⅸ 2,650.4 2,862.1 2,926.5 2,523.4 2,597.8 2,757.9 
Ⅹ 3,799.2 4,082.3 4,004.9 3,732.2 3,830.7 4,225.1 
 
 
2) KDI Income Panel (Using income decile of Total Data based on 
Household Standard) 
(Unit: 1,000 won) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Ⅰ 681.7 725.4 741.4 573.1 571.3 609.4 
Ⅱ 1,011.7 1,067.7 1,082.5 852.6 839.6 907.2 
Ⅲ 1,217.7 1,281.5 1,321.8 1,033.0 1,062.8 1,110.0 
Ⅳ 1,399.5 1,481.4 1,527.5 1,214.7 1,255.8 1,298.2 
Ⅴ 1,587.2 1,676.6 1,720.7 1,396.2 1,427.0 1,484.9 
Ⅵ 1,764.5 1,891.1 1,933.8 1,594.2 1,636.5 1,710.8 
Ⅶ 1,988.7 2,146.9 2,187.3 1,815.1 1,873.5 1,951.4 
Ⅷ 2,258.4 2,447.5 2,504.3 2,089.6 2,183.3 2,267.3 
Ⅸ 2,647.2 2,872.9 2,934.2 2,509.8 2,610.6 2,755.1 
Ⅹ 3,726.6 4,007.5 3,974.0 3,694.2 3,736.5 4,242.6 
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3) KDI Income Panel (After composition re-tiered as 10 Income 
Deciles) 
(UNit: 1,000won) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Ⅰ 727.4 796.3 784.5 601.0 634.1 647.6 
Ⅱ 1,091.3 1,163.9 1,157.7 897.2 952.3 1,009.9 
Ⅲ 1,288.4 1,388.7 1,424.3 1,084.7 1,171.3 1,239.4 
Ⅳ 1,487.0 1,596.1 1,644.1 1,290.0 1,360.0 1,439.3 
Ⅴ 1,683.7 1,811.7 1,858.7 1,478.3 1,561.4 1,664.2 
Ⅵ 1,878.2 2,046.9 2,083.3 1,675.9 1,777.5 1,892.6 
Ⅶ 2,106.2 2,300.5 2,352.8 1,886.0 2,028.1 2,162.1 
Ⅷ 2,381.4 2,587.2 2,662.6 2,160.7 2,311.1 2,491.1 
Ⅸ 2,789.9 2,994.9 3,130.4 2,574.5 2,708.9 3,002.6 
Ⅹ 3,863.9 4,127.2 4,182.8 3,752.7 3,834.0 4,595.8 
 
 
